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Much attention has been given to earnings inequality in recent years. 
Although most  agree that  the variable  of  interest is  lifetime wealth 
rather than current earnings,'  there has been relatively little study of 
differences in nonwage and salary components of earnings. Pension 
inequality is interesting for a number of reasons: First, pensions are a 
large fraction of total nonwage compensation. Second, there have been 
recent changes in laws that regulate sex-based differences in pension 
benefits. Third, private pensions have grown in importance over time 
and may become even more important in the future. 
What follows is an attempt to determine whether pensions exacerbate 
compensation inequality across groups. There are two aspects to this 
issue. The first is that the probability of receiving a pension may not 
be random across groups. For example, in Lazear (1979),  Retirement 
History Survey data revealed that 49% of the workers in the sample 
had  pension  plan  coverage, but blacks were  6.6% less likely to be 
covered than whites. Similarly, female coverage was 8.6% less than 
males. These patterns are investigated in more detail in the CPS data 
below. The second aspect is how the size of pensions varies with sex 
and race of people who are eligible to receive them. This is more difficult 
to determine and is the main focus of this study. 
Edward P.  Lazear  is  professor  of  industrial  relations,  Graduate  School  of  Busi- 
ness,  University of Chicago, and  research  associate, National  Bureau  of Economic 
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There are two empirical tasks before us. The first is to determine 
the characteristics of the average retiree in each sex and race group. 
Especially important is the average tenure, age, and salary of the typical 
retiree because pension amounts in most plans depend on these vari- 
ables. The second task is to estimate the pension  that each group’s 
typical retiree receives. This depends on the plan in which he is en- 
rolled, so it is necessary to use some representative sample of plans. 
The May 1979 Consumer Population Survey is used for the first task. 
This was chosen over the Retirement History Survey because of  the 
emphasis in this study on male/female and black/white comparisons. 
The coverage of  females  in  the Retirement History  Survey is  non- 
representative, whereas the CPS has a better cross-section of the rel- 
evant population. For the second task, a data set that was constructed 
by Lazear (1983) was used. It is based on the Bankers’ Trust Corporate 
Pension Plan Study (1980), covering about 200 plans. 
11.1  Age, Tenure and Salary of the Typical Retiree 
The 1979 CPS was used to impute the average age, tenure, and salary 
of  the typical retiree in four race/sex categories. This task  was less 
than straightforward because the relevant information is not reported 
in an appropriate form. Since the CPS is a cross-section, the date of 
retirement, and therefore age, tenure, and salary at the date of retire- 
ment, are not known for the group of  individuals who are currently 
working. For the individuals who have already retired, neither tenure 
nor final salary on their career (or even last job) is reported. Thus, it 
is necessary to devise a method that estimates the requisite information 
from the cross-section. 
The idea is to examine different cohorts and to infer from the dis- 
tribution of individuals across retirement and employment-tenure classes 
what the retirement age and tenure must have been, using a variant of 
synthetic cohort analysis. The following example illustrates the basic 
ideas. 
Suppose we are interested in the average level of tenure at retirement 
for some group and that only three age groups are relevant: No one 
retires before age 55, some retire at ages 55 and 56, and all are retired 
by age 57. The cross-section has workers and retirees at each age. So 
let us stratify the sample by  age. None age 55 are retired, and their 
tenure on the current job is reported. Suppose that half have tenure of 
20 years and half have tenure of 30 years. Although we cannot observe 
what happens to these individuals over the next year, we can examine 
the individuals who are currently 56 years old. In a steady state those 
individuals are identical to the current group of  55-year-olds, except 
that they are one year older. Suppose that half of the 56-year-olds are 343  Pension Inequality 
retired and of those who continue to work, three-fourths have tenure 
of 21  years, whereas only one-fourth  have tenure of  31 years. That 
implies that three-fourths of  those who retired before age 56  did so 
with 30 years of tenure and one-fourth did so with 20 years of tenure. 
Thus, (Y2)(3/4) = Ys of the population retire at age 55 with 30 years of 
tenure. Similarly, (%)(Y4)  = V8 retire at age 55 with 20 years of tenure. 
Since all workers are retired by 57, it follows that (Yz)(Y4) = Ys of the 
labor force retire at age 56 with 21  years of tenure and that (V2)(Y4) = 
Yx  of the labor force retire at age 56 with 31 years of tenure. Given this 
information it is easy to calculate the expected level of  tenure at re- 
tirement. In this case, it is 
(Y8)30 + (Ys)2O  + (Yx)21  + (Y8)31 = 25.5 years. 
The actual procedure is more complicated because there are many 
more age and tenure categories and because some workers take new 
jobs and others die. But the basic idea is the same. The procedure is 
applied to four groups: white males, white females, black males, and 
black  females. The subset  of  the CPS  sample  analyzed  consists of 
individuals who reported themselves either as retired or as currently 
working with valid information on job tenure, and who were from 55 
to 76 years old.*  The CPS reports whether individuals who are working 
are enrolled in a pension plan. We  restricted the sample to those who 
were enrolled because there are large differences in employment status, 
tenure, and salary levels by pension enr~llment.~ 
The next few pages  begin with  some definitions and describe the 
method used  in more detail. The estimates are based on a counting 
algorithm and steady-state assumptions. Define marginal counts 
N(a,i):  number of  workers in the cross-section of age a 
who have i years of tenure. 
N(a,R):  number age a who are retired. 
and transition counts 
Nj(a,i): 
NR(a,i):  number of age a with tenure i who retire during the year. 
number of age a with tenure i who will havej years 
of tenure next year. 
Ignoring unemployment, for transitions we have, for i 2 1 either: 
(1) j = i + 1:  if  the person remains on job 
(2) j = 1:  if the person turns over and obtains a new 
job 
(3) j = R: if  the person retires between years. 344  Edward P.  Lazear and Sherwin Rosen 
Finally, define 
ND(a,i):  number aged a and tenure i who die before age a +  1. 
The following accounting identities apply in a steady state: 
N(a,i) = Ni,l  (a,i) + N,(a,i) +  N,(a,i)  + ND(u,i). 
A person must go to one of the four mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
classifications. Further 
N(a + 1, i + 1) =  Nj+,(a,i). 
Persons found with one more year of  tenure in the following year must 
be those who transited to that state between years. And 
N(a +  1, 1) = 2 NI(U,i) + Nl(U,R). 
People with one year of  tenure are those who changed jobs or who 
came out of retirement. Similarly, 
~(a  +  1, R) = 2 N,(a,i)  + N,(u,R). 
i 
Those observed retired in the next year either transited to that state 
during the year or were retired earlier and remained retired. Therefore 
(1)  N,(a,i)  = N(a,i) - Ni+,(a,i)  - N,(a,i) - ND(a,i) 
= N(a,i) -  N(a + 1, i +  1) - N,(a,i) - ND(a,i). 
We  seek to estimate NR(u,i).  Both  N(a,i) and N(a + 1, i + 1) are 
observed in the cross-section data. However, no data are available from 
a cross-section on transitions Nl(.,.)  or ND(.,.),  so some assumptions 
are required to impute them. 
Let P(a,i)  be the probability that a worker aged a with tenure i takes 
a new job and transits to state i = 1. Include R in the set {i}.  Then 
N,(a,i) = P(a,i) N(a,i) 
so 
I  I 
If  there are A  age groups and T tenure classes (2) represents A - 1 
equations in (A - l)T  unknown P(a,i).  The marginal counts N(a,i)  are 
not sufficient to estimate P(u,i),  and therefore N,(u,i),  without  addi- 
tional restrictions on P(a,i). We  know from other studies (see Mixer 
and Jovanovic 1981) that P is decreasing in  i and probably in a as well. 345  Pension Inequality 
To  make things simple and computationally tractable we assume that 
P(a,i) takes the form 
P(a,i) = (ao  + ala + a2a2  + pli +  p2z7 + Sia)(l -  R) 
where R = 1 if the person is retired and R  = 0 if  not. 
Define N(a) = ZjXR  N(a,i) as the working population of  age a and 
N(a,R),  as before, as those retired. Then, substituting for P(a,i)  in (2) 
and summing yields 
(3) 
+ R(60 + 61a), 
N(a +  1, 1) = afl(u) + a,[aN(a)l + a2Ca2N(a)l 
+ PJC  i~(a,i)l  + p2[C  i2~(a,i)l 
+ s~ui  i~(a,i)~  + ~4a,R)  + s,~N(~,R). 
I 
Treat (3) as a regression equation, in which the observed counts N(a + 1, 
1) are regressed on observed variables N(a),  aN(a), . . ., etc. across 
age groups. There are eight unknown parameters in this regression, so 
if A I  9, this regression can be estimated. 
In our data A  = 21, so there are only 13 degrees of freedom. There- 
fore, the individual parameters (a,  p, A, 6) are not estimated precisely. 
In addition some of the regressors are collinear. Nevertheless, we get 
unbiased estimates p(u,i).  From these we obtain unbiased estimates of 
N,(u,i),  from 
Al(a,i)  = F(u,i)~(u,i). 
A similar procedure works in general for estimates of ND(a,i).  How- 
ever, we find that the data are too thin to obtain meaningful results for 
the relationship between  death probabilities  conditional on both age 
and tenure. We  therefore assume 
fiD(aji) = P*(a)N(u - 1, i) 
where P(a)  is the 1979 age-specific death rate for this race-sex class. 
We  know that there is a strong negative association between work and 
death so ND(a,R)  is likely to be biased from this procedure. The biases 
with respect to i are less clear-cut, though it is probable that fiD(a,i) 
for large  i is upward biased, since people who are currently working 
and with long tenure are likely to be healthier than average. 
(4)  fiR(a,i>  = ~(a,i)  -  N(U + 1,  i +  1) -  fil(a,i) -  RD  (u,i). 
Now Cj  NR(a,i)  is the total number of people aged a who retire and 
ZaiC N,(a,i)  is the total number who retire in the whole population at 
any age. Therefore, 
From the identity above, NR(a,i)  is estimated from 
(5)  n(a) = xj NR(a,i)/EZ  NR(a,i) 346  Edward P.  Lazear and Sherwin Rosen 
is the probability of retiring at age a, given that death does not occur 
prior to retirement, and 
(6)  Xi an(a) = E(age of retirement) = EaR. 
Similarly, ,Za  NR(a,i)  is the number of people who retire after i years 
of  tenure, so 
(7)  m(i) = Xa  N,(a,i)/XX  NR(a,i) 
is the conditional probability  of retiring at tenure  i given that death 
occurs after retirement. 
Therefore 
(8)  EiR = E(tenure at retirement) = 2 irn(i). 
Before turning to the estimates, some qualifications are in order. 
1. If fiD is biased upward for larger i, then there is a downward bias 
in m(i)  for large i (and upward bias in m(i)  for small i).  Therefore EiK 
is probably biased down on this account. However, this source of bias 
is likely to be small. 
2. Even though the estimates of N,(a,i)  are no doubt imprecise, the 
usual sampling theory suggests that E(a) and E(i)  are better measures 
than any of their components, through the law of large numbers. Now 
if the pension formulas were linear in a and i, these means are sufficient 
statistics for our problem.  However,  these  schemes are not  linear. 
Therefore in  predicting expected pensions and pension  wealth from 
each plan, it would be preferable to take weighted averages across (a,i) 
pairs rather than taking the outcome for the average person. The pre- 
ferred alternative is simply not feasible with these data. 
3. The imputation procedure assumes no cohort effects. This is dic- 
tated by  a cross-section  since it is well known  that cohort and age 
effects cannot be identified in a cross-section except through arbitrary 
assumptions.  The formulas above make  the strong steady  state as- 
sumption that for a < a‘ people who attain age a’ at (a’ - a) periods 
in the future will behave “as if people age a’ are behaving today (1979).” 
We  know that the age of retirement has shown a secular decline for 
males in the post-World  War I1 period. Increasing wealth, changes in 
tax laws and in the social security system, as well as changes in family 
composition and yet other factors are all contributory causes. If these 
trends continue, then E(a)  is likely to be smaller in the future than our 
estimate: The average age of retirement for older cohorts in our sample 
was surely larger than our estimate. On the other hand, those issues 
are reversed for females, given the large increase in female labor force 
participation  in  recent decades. Since our estimates for females are 
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conditioned on working, it is probable that cohort bias of this sort is 
far less important for women than for men. 
The influence of cohort effects on expected tenure is less clear-cut. 
There are little data on secular changes in tenure on which to base an 
a priori judgment. If retirement continues to occur at younger ages this 
is likely to reduce tenure at retirement as well. However, the relation 
between age and tenure is noisy, so though there may be cohort bias 
in E(i)  qualitatively similar to that of E(a),  it is likely to be quantitatively 
smaller. Changing labor force behavior of women and conditioning on 
labor force participants again makes these considerations less impor- 
tant for women; if  anything, the cohort bias for women tends to go in 
the opposite direction than for men. 
4. This procedure  is based  on actual counts in the CPS tape for 
N(a,i).  If all cohorts were the same size, and if  sample data reflected 
this exactly, then, on the usual synthetic cohort assumptions, every- 
thing works out correctly. However, some adjustments are necessary 
if either birth cohorts vary in size (which they do) or sample sizes vary 
randomly with age. The following approach, which is incorporated into 
the calculations, corrects the problem. 
Define N(a)  as the total number of  individuals in the sample of  age 
a. We  normalize everything in terms of N(55). If  this were a panel, 
then the difference between N(55)  and N(56) reflects only deaths during 
the year. But in our synthetic panel, N(56) may deviate from N(55) 
because of real differences in cohort sizes or random sampling differ- 
ences across age groups. However, death rates  are known with ac- 
curacy, so an estimate of  the corrected age 56 sample can be easily 
obtained. In fact, P(a),  defined above, does exactly that. Thus, as an 
initial condition set 
fi(56) = N(55)[1 -  P(55)]. 
Then the following recursion applies for a > 56 
fi(u) = &(a - 1)[1 -  P(a - l)]. 
The ratio of N(a)lfl(a)  = A(a)  reflects random sampling size or cohort 
size differences. To  correct our estimates for these factors, it is nec- 
essary only to divide all flR(a,i)  by A(a). Then equations (5)-(8)  follow 
as written. 
This discussion points to another possible  source of  bias that we 
have ignored, nonretirement transitions out of the labor force. This is 
likely to lead to relatively small error for the aged population we study 
here because these transitions are relatively minor among older workers. 
5. In the data actually used we identify 21 age classes, a = 55, . . ., 
75,  and 54  tenure classes, i = 1, . . ., 54. Since the sample consists of 
some  1,600+  persons, many of  the N(a,i)  cells are very small, and 348  Edward P.  Lazear and Sherwin Rosen 
many are empty. To deal with this problem we aggregated across tenure 
intervals and then interpolated tenure-specific totals by regression: In 
particular, define 
After inspection of  the raw cells,  11 such sums were defined for each 
age:  I, = (l),  I2 = (2,6),  I3 = (7,11),  I4 = (12,16),  Is = (17,21), 
I,, = (48,541. Define 
(9) 
16  = (22,26),  17 = (27,31),  Is = (32,36),  19  (37,41),  I,, = (42,47), 
as the midpoint in years of the jth I,  interval. 
We  fit the regression 
x(u,Z,)  = bo + blu + b2u2 + b3& + b,lj  + b,Ca  + 63 
to the aggregated data for purposes of  smoothing and interpolation. 
The variables B  for black, F for female, and D for i = I, are dummies. 
Then 
wR  (u,i)  = 6,  + 6,u + 6,u2  + 6,i  + h4  i2 + &iu 
was used to calculate the distributions n(u) and m(i)  used for our es- 
timates of EiR and Eu, above. Appendix A reports the regression in 
+ b,F  + b8D  + bg(aB) + b,,(aF)  + bll(D . B)  + 612(D  F) 
(9). 
The estimates are contained in table  11.1. 
Expected age of retirement of persons covered by private pensions 
is remarkably uniform across race and  sex groups.  Remember that 
these numbers are conditioned on labor force participants as well as 
pension  eligibility. This explains  the lack of  appreciable differences 
between males and females. While older females are far less likely to 
participate in labor market activity than males, those that do participate 
show average retirement ages that are similar to those of men. In fact, 
Eu,  is slightly larger for women. Since estimated EaR is close to the 
early retirement age under social security, the somewhat larger value 
for women may reflect known smaller coverage and experience under 
Table 11.1  Estimated Age, Tenure and Salary at Retirement 
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social security than for men. The somewhat larger difference between 
black males and females may be due to these same factors, as well as 
to the fact that labor force participation  of  black women historically 
has exceeded that of white women. Whatever factors affect these dif- 
ferences in  participation  rates  apparently  also makes black  women 
retire later in life. 
The most surprising result in table  11.1 refers to the sex and race 
differences in  expected tenure at retirement.  For whites we find that 
expected tenure on the job held  at  retirement is virtually  the same 
between the sexes and is a remarkably long 22 years in length. As a 
check, this estimate is similar to average tenure levels for those still 
working in the CPS data. Recent work on job tenure patterns for males 
shows a characteristic pattern that most job mobility occurs at younger 
ages. By middle age most job mobility that will occur over a lifetime 
has already taken place, so it is not surprising that for the older male 
workers in our sample the average tenure at retirement is 22.0 years. 
The result for women seems surprising at first glance, but is less so 
when it is recalled that these calculations refer to working women at 
age 55 and older. The estimate reflects the fact that a significant number 
of women are permanently attached not only to the labor force but 
also to their place of work, either through their whole careers or cer- 
tainly subsequent to reentry into the labor market after childbearing 
years. 
These similarities between sexes are apparent among blacks as well 
as whites in table  11.1. However, the difference between the races is 
substantial. Taken at face value, these differences must reflect much 
greaterjob mobility among older blacks than among older whites. While 
there is some evidence that job and labor market instability is larger for 
blacks than for whites at younger ages, we are unaware of confirming 
evidence on these differences between races among older workers. It 
should be noted in this connection that our sample is much smaller for 
blacks than for whites, and the individual N(a,i)  cells are correspond- 
ingly thinner. Hence, the smoothness procedures used and described 
above may ultimately account for these differences: Certainly any con- 
fidence interval on these estimates would be much larger for blacks than 
for whites, based on sampling variation alone. In fact, the results for 
blacks are sensitive to the specification of equation (9), which causes us 
concern. This fact must be borne in mind when interpreting the black/ 
white differences below. Still, there is nothing in the procedure used that 
would by itself produce this point estimate, and the similarity between 
black men and black women is not automatically implied by our method. 
The last bit of information necessary to perform the simulations is 
the final salary at time of retirement, since many plans are geared to 350  Edward P.  Lazear and Sherwin Rosen 
these figures. The estimate is based on a standard earnings regression 
for each racehex group of the form 
(10) 
where the c’s are regression parameters and u is regression error. After 
fitting this equation for each age-sex group, the estimated average salary 
for the average person is estimated by evaluating it at u = Ea,  and 
i = EiR. The regressions are contained in Appendix A. The earnings 
estimates are shown in the third column of table 11.1, labeled ES.4 
The salary regression  does not  include the usual elaborate list of 
controls such as education,  marital  status, occupation,  and the like 
because we are not particularly interested in this study of  the partial 
effects of such variables. Hence the coefficients on the age and tenure 
variables capture the effects of  variations in these other variables that 
are correlated with age and tenure. This is conceptually appropriate 
for our purposes because we desire an estimate of  mean final salary 
for each race-sex group over all education, occupation, industry, and 
marital status classes. A more elaborate regression would require re- 
weighting these  other  effects  by  relative  sample proportions:  The 
regression above is self-weighting in this respect and is sufficient for 
the problem at hand. Also, the regression has been specified in terms 
of earnings levels rather than the usual log of earnings. A log transform 
is known to provide a better fit when all age groups are included in the 
sample, but there is no compelling reason for using that transform for 
the older people in our sample since it is well known that much of the 
curvature in life-cycle earnings patterns occurs at younger ages. Fur- 
thermore, it is the level and not the log of earnings that is relevant for 
pension determination, so we also avoid the questionable u,  correction 
for error variance in transforming the log to the level by this procedure. 
The percentage differences between white men and women at Ea, 
and Ei, in table 1 1.1 conform to the percentage differences in earnings 
found in the population as a whole. This is rather surprising because 
the women in our sample exhibit the same mean age of retirement and 
tenure at retirement as men do, and it is generally thought that the raw 
difference in  earnings between  men and women in  the population at 
large is related in some way to differences in labor force activity over 
the life cycle. No doubt many of the women in  our sample reentered 
the market after childbearing. Whatever the case, they never caught 
up with the men. This is both surprising and worthy of more detailed 
investigation. The same relative pattern is repeated among blacks, but 
at a much lower level. 
One final qualification is necessary concerning these salary estimates. 
The salary observations are censored by the retirement decision itself. 
Earnings  = co + c,a +  c2a2 + c3i + C~Z’ + u, 351  Pension Inequality 
Thus the older individuals in the sample who were working found it in 
their interest not to retire because their wage prospects were evidently 
larger than their opportunity cost of leisure. People who continue to 
work  are generally  healthier than  average  and many  have  superior 
earnings prospects, so the observed wages of older-than-average work- 
ers in our sample are likely to be larger than the wage prospects avail- 
able to workers of  these ages who chose not to work. Therefore ex- 
pected  salary at age of  retirement calculated above probably  is too 
large for the average worker. 
11.2  Pension Values of the Typical Retirees 
Given the information  in table  11.1, the pension  of  these typical 
retirees can be calculated from information on pension benefit formulas. 
The information used comes from a data set generated by Lazear (1983). 
A description follows. 
The data for Lazear’s analysis were constructed using the Bankers’ 
Trust Corporate Pension Plan Study (1980). The study consists of a 
detailed verbal  description of  the pension  plans  of  over 200  of  the 
nation’s largest corporations. The data set applies to approximately 10 
million  workers, and this  comprises about one-fourth of  the entire 
covered population. The major empirical task was to convert the verbal 
descriptions into machine-readable  data. This required  setting up a 
coding system that was specific enough to capture all of the essential 
detail  associated  with  each  plan.  It  was  then  necessary  to write  a 
program which calculates the present value of pension benefits at each 
age of retirement. 
Pension benefit formulas are of three different types. The two most 
common fall under the rubric of defined benefit plans, which specifies 
the pension flow as a fixed payment determined by some formula. The 
pattern plan awards the recipient a flat dollar amount per year worked 
prior to retirement. The conventional plan calculates the pension ben- 
efit flow from a formula which depends upon years of service and some 
average or final salary.  In contrast to the defined benefit plans  are 
defined contribution plans in which the employer (or employee) con- 
tributes a specified amount each year  during work life to a pension 
fund. The flow of  pension benefits that the worker receives upon re- 
tirement is a function of the market value of that fund. The defined 
contribution plan is much less frequently used than is either the pattern 
plan or conventional plan. Only defined benefit plans are used here. 
Some plans do not permit the individual to receive early retirement 
benefits or only permit early retirement up to a given number of years 
before the normal date. This means that in order to perform the nec- 352  Edward P.  Lazear and Sherwin Rosen 
essary comparisons, some plans had to be deleted because age or tenure 
values in table 11.1 violated restrictions of the plan. Less than 15% of 
plans were deleted for this reason. 
Most plans have restrictions on the maximum amount which can be 
accrued, and many provide for minimum benefits. Additionally, a num- 
ber reduce pension  benefits by  some fraction of  the social  security 
benefits to which some basic class is entitled. Moreover, a number of 
plans  provide  supplements for retirement before the social security 
eligibility age. Sometimes these supplements relate directly to social 
security payments; at other times they depend upon the individual’s 
salary or benefit level. Other restrictions have to do with vesting re- 
quirements, with the maximum age at which the individual begins em- 
ployment, and with the minimum number of years served before the 
basic accrual or particular supplements are applicable. The accrual rate, 
or flat dollar amount per  year to which the individual is entitled, is 
often a nonlinear function of tenure and salary, and these kinks had to 
be programmed into the calculations. 
This permits computation of the flow of  retirement income in each 
of  these plans, for each of  the four typical  workers. To  get present 
values of the pension flows, a 10% discount factor was used. Finally, 
in performing the actuarial correction, it was necessary to choose a 
life table. The 1979 United States Vital Statistics tables were used. 
The  choice  of  table  turns  out  to be  the  least  crucial  part  of  the 
analysis.  Values  do not  vary  greatly  from  year  to  year,  and  dis- 
counting  makes  unimportant  whatever  small  differences  there  are 
among tables. 
Each of our four typical individuals was run through 172 of the plans 
for which qualification criteria were met. The expected present value 
of retirement benefits (in date of retirement dollars) was estimated for 
each of those individuals in each of the plans. Table 1 1.2 provides some 
summary statistics on the results of  that simulation. 
Table 11.2  Pension Present Value for Typical Retiree (All Pensions) 
(N = 172) 
Expected 
Group  Mean  Pension*  S.D.  Max  Med  Min 
White males  $30,284  $18,412  $17,860  $142,111  $28,422  $862 
White females  23,527  11,340  11,152  87,193  22,000  833 
Black males  17,396  9,550  9,545  78,342  16,067  833 
Black females  15,997  6,558  8,771  59,723  15.105  740 
*Expected pension is defined  as the raw probability (from table  11.6) times the mean 
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11.3  Results 
There are a number of interesting findings that come from this anal- 
ysis. Let us turn first to the question that was posed at the outset, 
namely, does pension wealth exacerbate inequality? Recall that there 
are two aspects to the question. The first relates to the probability that 
a worker in a given demographic category has a pension; the second 
regards the expected pension value for pension plan participants. The 
first was investigated by using the CPS data to estimate a linear prob- 
ability model. In table 11.6, the dependent variable is a dummy equal 
to one if  the individual in  question participates in a private pension 
plan. The sample consists of all working individuals between 55 and 
76 years old with tenure reported. 
A look at the coefficients in table 11.6 makes it appear as if  blacks 
and females do not differ from white males in terms of their probabilities 
of  participation  in a pension  plan.  (Both coefficients are essentially 
zero.) Appearances are deceiving because earnings are held constant. 
Earnings have a strong positive association with pensions, and since 
blacks and females have lower earnings than white males, most of the 
difference can be accounted for by differences in earnings. While women 
and blacks who earn the same wages as white males are likely to enjoy 
the same pension participation status, women and blacks are unlikely 
to earn the same amount as white men. 
The more important statistic for this analysis is the raw probability 
of participation in a pension plan. Those probabilities are reported in 
table 11.6 as well. White males have the highest probability of partic- 
ipating in a pension plan while other groups, especially black women, 
are substantially behind. These probabilities will play an important role 
in the subsequent discussion. 
To  examine the second question,  namely, how  do pensions vary 
among participants by race and sex, we call on the information in tables 
11.2- 1 1.5. First, compare the first and last columns of table 11.5. 
The first column reports the ratio of pension value means from table 
11.2 for the relevant group so that the first entry is 23,527/30,284. The 
fifth column reports the ratio of salary means from table 11.1 so the 
first entry is 11,414/17,970. 
Table 11.3  Pension Present Value for Typical Retiree Defined Benefit Pattern 
Plans (N = 48) 
Group  Mean  S.D.  Max  Med  Min 
White males  $23,277  $6,822  $40,483  $23,724  $  4,486 
Black males  15,067  4,280  26,612  15,000  13,750 
Black females  15,110  4,285  26,817  15,105  3,110 
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Table 11.4  Pension Present Value for Typical Retiree Defined Benefit 
Conventional Plans (N = W) 
Group  Mean  S.D.  Max  Med  Min 
White males  $32,991  $20,042  $142,111  $3 1,264  $862 
White females  24,032  12,520  87,193  22,000  833 
Black males  18,260  10,833  78,342  16,523  833 
Black females  16,342  8,899  59,723  15,105  740 
Table 11.5  Ratios of  Means 
Pension Values and Final Salary 
Expected  Final 
Groups  All  Pattern  Conventional  Pension (ALL)  Salary 
White female/white  male  .776  ,958  ,728  .615  ,635 
Black male/white male  .574  ,647  ,553  .518  ,734 
Black femalelwhite female  ,679  ,677  ,680  ,578  ,942 
Black femaleiwhite  male  ,919  1.002  ,894  .687  315 
NOTE:  Black male patterdwhite male conventional = ,456. Black female patterdwhite female 
conventional = ,628. 
First consider black males and white males. The second row of table 
11.5 is relevant. Note that the ratio of the mean salary at retirement 
for these groups is .734 and that the ratio of pension benefits is S74. 
If workers were distributed randomly across the plans (which they are 
not), then the existence of pensions would tend to increase blacwwhite 
male inequality. This is true for two reasons. First, as reported earlier, 
blacks are less likely to have pensions than whites. Second, given that 
black males do receive a pension, they receive a considerably smaller 
amount in pension benefits than whites. A measure that combines both 
aspects is the ratio of  expected pension, defined as the ratio of the 
mean pension times the raw probabilities from table 11.6. That number 
is reported in the fourth column as .518 so pensions appear to exac- 
erbate inequality. (Recall, however, that results for blacks are not ro- 
bust to specification.) The magnitudes, although not astronomical, are 
not trivial either. For white males, the present value of pension wealth 
averages somewhat less than 2 years’ income. For black males, the 
average value of pension wealth is somewhat less than 1 year of income. 
Because of  the  significant salary  differences, conventional plans, 
which base the pension on final salary, exacerbate the black/white male 
differences. Tables 11.3 and 11.4 split the sample of  plans into pattern 
and conventional plans. The second column of  table 11.5 reports the 
ratios of  means given in table  11.3 and the third column reports the 
ratios of means from table 11.4. 355  Pension Inequality 
Table 11.6 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Probability of  Participation in a Private Pension Plan 
Constant 




Raw probabilities of participation: 
White males  = .608 . 
White females  = .482 
Black males  = .549 
Black females  = .410 
1.559 
-  ,0019 
,01856 
,0035 






A comparison of  column 3 with column 1 in table 11.5 reveals that 
the ratios in  the third column are smaller for all groups that do not 
include black females, because  salary levels are important for com- 
putation of conventional pension plans.  Black males who have con- 
ventional plans are at even more of  a disadvantage relative to white 
males in the same plans because their earnings are lower. Perhaps more 
important is that blacks and whites are unlikely to be found in similar 
proportions in the two plan types. Pattern plans are more typical for 
production  workers,  whereas the conventional plan  is the norm for 
management and white-collar workers. To the extent that blacks are 
overrepresented among pattern plans, pension inequality is even more 
pronounced. At the extreme, if  all black males had pattern plans and 
all white males had conventional plans, then the ratio of the pension 
value means would be .456, whereas salary ratios are .734. 
The findings for black  females  and white  females  are even more 
striking. The salary column of table 1 1.5 reveals that the ratio of black 
to white female salary is .942, whereas the ratio of pension value is 
only .679. If  all white females were in conventional plan occupations 
and all black females were in pattern plan occupations, the pension 
inequality would be even greater. That ratio would be .628 instead of 
.679. The reason for the difference is that conventional plans are gen- 
erally more lucrative than pattern plans,  except at very low  salary 
levels. Similarly, the ratio of expected pension for these groups is S78, 
implying even greater inequality because black females are less likely 
to be enrolled in a pension plan at all. No matter how we measure it, 
pensions appear to increase blacklwhite inequality relative to that es- 
timated by salary measures. 
The male/female comparisons are less clear-cut. Effects go in op- 
posite directions. As reported above, female workers are less likely to 
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the white females do well relative to their male counterparts. The first 
row of table 11.5 contains the relevant information. The ratio of final 
salary of  white females to white males is  .635 whereas the ratio of 
pension  values is  .776. This implies an equalizing effect of  pension 
benefits. Part of this results from the fact that defined benefit plans are 
not sex-specific, so that women, with longer life expectancies, do better 
than men.  But this cannot account for the large difference between 
.776 and .635. 
The reason why women do so well in pension benefits can best be 
understood by examining the distinction between pattern and conven- 
tional plans. Note that women are almost on par with men in terms of 
pension benefits received in pattern plans. This results from one factor: 
Pattern plans depend only on years of service, and in that respect, the 
women who are working at age 55 are quite similar to men. This large 
value of tenure maps into high pension flows in the pattern plan. (Be- 
cause of the actuarial unfairness of the plan, it could actually have gone 
the other way. Since tenure levels are close to comparable, the longer 
life expectancy of females could have made their pattern plan pensions 
worth more than those of males.) 
The equalizing effect of pensions is offset almost exactly by the fact 
that fewer women than men are enrolled in pension plans. From table 
11.6, white men had a probability of receiving a pension of  .608,  whereas 
white women had a probability of .482. It is useful, therefore, to com- 
pare expected pensions. The ratio of expected pension for white fe- 
males to white males is .615 from the last column of table 11.5. Thus, 
pensions leave white female/white male wealth inequality unaltered. 
The same pattern is displayed for blacks.  The black female’s final 
salary is 81% that of the black male in this sample, and the mean black 
female’s pension benefit is 92% of the mean black male’s pension. But 
expected pension ratios tell the opposite story. Since black females are 
much less likely to be pension recipients, the ratio of expected pension 
benefits is  .687. Thus, pensions increase male/female inequality sub- 
stantially among blacks. 
This conclusion is strengthened somewhat when it is recalled that 
these women are not  a random  sample of  the overall population  of 
women. Since a larger proportion of women will  have dropped out of 
the labor force before reaching age 55, and since it is likely that those 
individuals have very small pension wealth, the numbers presented in 
the last paragraph tend to understate the disequalizing effect of pensions 
in the overall economy. 
Other interesting findings are worthy of discussion. Most obvious is 
that there is much more variation in the benefits provided by conven- 
tional plans than in those provided by pattern plans. A comparison of 
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deviation  is much larger for conventional plans.  Similarly, with the 
exception of  white males, medians  are about the same across plan 
types, but the maximum and minimum values are much more extreme 
in the case of conventional plans. 
Variance in pension benefits received in conventional plans depends 
on two factors. The first is that for a given salary, companies differ 
substantially more in their conventional pension formulas than in their 
pattern plan formulas. Second, a positive correlation between the firm’s 
average salary and generosity of the pension formula contributes vari- 
ance to benefits received. Although it is conceivable that the two types 
of variation will offset one another, it is unlikely. There is already some 
evidence of a positive correlation between average salary in the firm 
and the generosity of pension benefits (see Asch [1984] and the salary 
coefficients in table 11.6). 
Before concluding, we should mention that another study addresses 
the same questions as we do but obtains somewhat different results. 
McCarthy and Turner (1984) find that blacks actually have higher pen- 
sions than whites do, both in terms of pension flow and pension wealth 
(see their table  1). They use the Survey of  Private Pension  Benefit 
Amounts, a data set that permits pairing of individuals with the actual 
pensions  they receive. On the face of it, this data set is superior to 
those that we have used.  But their findings leave some grounds for 
doubt on that score. In particular, it is difficult to believe that blacks 
have higher pensions than whites because even in the group of pension 
plan participants, the average final salary of a black male is only 63.5% 
of the white male (see our table 11 3.  Since many pension plans depend 
on  final salary,  even  if  tenure at retirement  did  not  differ between 
groups, the pension flow ratio would mirror the salary ratio. It is im- 
portant to reconcile the two sets of results, but McCarthy and Turner 
are unable to make their data available to the public, so their results 
cannot be replicated. 
11.4  Conclusion 
The existence of pension plans appears to contribute to black/white 
inequality but leaves male/female inequality unchanged among whites. 
Even though females are less likely to receive pensions than males, 
those females who do receive pensions tend to receive relatively gen- 
erous ones. Of  course, the average pension  that the typical retiring 
female receives is well below that received by the typical male retiree. 
But the difference is not as pronounced as male/female differences in 
salary.  Among blacks,  pensions exacerbate sex  differences, mainly 
because black women are only about 75% as likely to receive pensions 
as black males. 358  Edward P.  Lazear and Sherwin Rosen 
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-  6,738 
df  911  937  509  65  42 
R2  ,038  .077  .112  ,074  ,076 
Mean of  dependent variable:  18.855  10,397  13,857  10,206 
Notes 
1. E.g.,  see are Lillard (1977), Rosen (1977), Lazear (1979), and Lillard and 
Willis (1978). 359  Pension Inequality 
2. We  ignore those who retire earlier than 55 because it is likely that only a 
very small number of workers with pensions retire before age 55. 
3. For example, not  enrolled black  women earn an average of  $3,471 per 
year, whereas enrolled black women earn $10,206. 
4. Note that although the earnings regressions are imprecise, the estimates 
derived from them and used in table  11.1 are close to the unconditional mean 
for each group. 
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Comment  Sylvester J. Schieber 
The question that Lazear and Rosen address here is whether private 
sector pensions  exacerbate compensation inequality across groups- 
specifically by race and gender.  There are two aspects to consider. 
First, the probability of receiving a pension is not random across groups. 
The second aspect is conditional on receiving a pension and whether 
systematic variation exists in benefit amounts received based on race 
or gender. The authors focus on the latter. 
Organizationally, Lazear and Rosen undertake their analysis in two 
stages. They first determine the average age, tenure, and salary char- 
Sylvester J. Schieber is director of The Research and Information Center of the Wyatt 
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acteristics at retirement for each race-gender group on the basis of the 
age, tenure, and salary characteristics estimated in the first stage. They 
then  estimate the pension  that  each  group prototype person  would 
receive under 172 different pension plans. They use the results of this 
exercise to assess the distributional effects of pensions. 
The first stage of  their paper is an interesting exercise in adapting 
data to an analytical problem for which appropriate, straightforward 
data generally  are not  available.  1 refrain from  commenting on the 
mechanics of this segment of the paper because I think the generated 
results are inappropriate for addressing the question of the role pensions 
play in distributing income. I concur with the view that pensions may 
exacerbate wage inequality, but  they  are more  likely to do so on a 
coverage than a benefit  structure basis.  Lazear  and Rosen did  not 
address the pension coverage, participation, and benefit receipt issue, 
but it is well known that pension participation  rates are significantly 
lower at the bottom of the earnings than at mid-or-upper earnings levels. 
To have ignored this aspect of the question is a general limitation that 
weakens the remaining analysis. 
In the estimates of final average salary/age/tenure characteristics for 
each of the race-gender groups shown in Lazear and Rosen’s table 
ll,l,  the authors include pension plan participants and those not en- 
rolled  in  pension  plans.  Their reported  estimate found  that blacks’ 
tenure in their terminal job was less than half that of whites-1  1 years 
versus 23 years. They estimated that the terminal salaries varied sig- 
nificantly by race and gender. For example, white males’ final salaries 
were estimated to be about two-thirds higher than those of both white 
women and black men. At the same time, while estimated black males’ 
final salaries were roughly equal to those of white women, they were 
about twice those of black women. 
My concern is that the authors’ tenure and salary estimates tend to 
exaggerate differences that might exist across the groups studied. The 
classes of workers participating  in pension  plans are more homoge- 
neous  at or near retirement than  the authors’ analysis  suggests.  To 
illuminate this point, I have looked at the same 55-75-year-old workers 
from the May 1979 Current Population Survey that Lazear and Rosen 
used  in their analysis.  Consider, for example, the  difference  in  the 
percentage of  each relevant race-gender group working full-time by 
whether or not the group was participating  in a pension plan.  Table 
11  .C.  1 shows that, across the four groups studied, pension participants 
consistently were more likely to be working full time. Also, there was 
only one-third the variation in the percentage of pension participants, 
compared to nonparticipants, working full time. 
Though full-time employment status is not a precondition for partic- 
ipation in a pension plan, table 11.C.2 does indicate that a strong cor- 361  Pension Inequality 
Table ll.C.l  Pension Participation Status of 55 to 75 Year-Old 
Full-time Workers 
Percent Working Full Time 
All Workers  Pension Non Participants  Pension Participants 
White Males  86.3%  76.4%  96.1% 
Black Males  82.5  69.9  92.1 
Black Females  55.1  37.2  84.0 
White Females  66.7  53.9  83.3 
SOURCE:  May 1979 Current Population Survey 
Table ll.C.2  Pension Participation 55 to 75 Year Old Workers 
Percent Participating in a Pension Plan 
Part-time Workers  Full-time Workers 
White Males  14.5%  56.0% 
White Females  21.9  54.4 
Black Males  25.9  63.5 
Black Females  13.7  58.5 
____~ 
SOURCE:  May 1979 Current Population Survey 
Table ll.C.3  Estimated Final Job Tenure and Median Attained Tenure of 
Workers Aged 55 to 75 by  Pension Participation Status 
EiR  Pension Nonparticipants*  Pension Participants* 
White Males  23.1  11.1  19.5 
White Females  22.9  6.3  13.8 
Black Males  10.8  10.6  21 .0 
Black Females  10.6  7.2  16.2 
*SOURCE:  May 1979 Current Population Survey 
relation exists between full-time employment and participation status. 
Table 11  .C.2  also suggests that the prevalence of pension participation 
among blacks actually exceeds that for whites among full-time workers 
within the age cohorts considered here. In any event, it is clear that 
from a pension participation perspective, far more homogeneity exists 
across the four groups of full-time workers than from full- to part-time 
workers in any combination. 
The incentives built into pension plans to  discourage worker turnover 
also differentiate pension participants from nonparticipants. Compar- 
ison of group median tenures in table 11  .C.3 indicates that among older 
pension participants blacks have attained longer tenures than whites 
and men longer tenures than women. This is a different result than that 362  Edward P.  Lazear and Sherwin Rosen 
suggested by the Lazear-Rosen estimates also shown in the table 11.C.3. 
Analyzing pension benefit distributions based on tenures that do not 
reflect reasonable periods of participation under the plans biases the 
results. The low tenure estimates for blacks from the Lazear-Rosen 
model used here would have significantly  reduced the estimated benefits 
for blacks and inflated the relative benefits estimated for white women. 
The other crucial variable for determining pension benefits under 
most defined benefit plans is final salary. The estimated final salaries 
from the Lazear-Rosen model are compared in table 11  .C.4 to  estimated 
median earnings derived from the May  1979 CPS. Again the model 
exaggerates the group salary differences across the racial groups when 
the Lazear-Rosen estimates are compared with median earnings levels 
of pension participants from the May 1979 CPS. It is only when white 
males are compared to white females that the relative differences in 
the two sets of estimates are similar. To  the extent the model system- 
atically underestimates final salaries of blacks, it also would tend to 
exaggerate the authors’ conclusion that “the existence of pension plans 
contributes to blacklwhite inequality.” 
Pension plan design is regulated by the Internal Revenue Code that 
limits the ability of  plans to discriminate among participants on the 
basis  of  salary. A pension  benefit  structure that  provides relatively 
higher benefits to upper-income beneficiaries can only do so within the 
strict confines of the IRS integration regulations. The regulations rec- 
ognize social security’s redistributive nature and allow an employer to 
take  partial  advantage of  the relatively  higher benefits  provided  to 
lower-wage workers by social security in designing the pension benefit 
formula. But in no case is the progressive structure of social security 
to be fully offset by the pension benefit structure. The result is that 
the combined benefit structure, even for highly integrated plans, should 
still be somewhat progressive. Only 11% of the final pay plans and 23% 
of the career average plans included in the Bankers’ Trust Survey were 
not integrated. The mere existence of integrated plans, and especially 
their prevalence included in the Lazear-Rosen analysis, suggests that 
social  security  should be  included  in further analytic efforts of  the 
distributional issues addressed here. 
Table ll.C.4  Estimated Final Salary and Median Earnings of Workers Aged 55 
to 75 by Pension Participation Status 
ES  Pension Nonparticipants*  Pension Participants* 
White Males  $17,830  $9,663  $16,300 
White Females  10,680  4,816  9,524 
Black Males  10,118  6,119 
Black Females  5,109  3,284 
12,501 
8,564 
*SOURCE:  Derived from the May  1979 Current Population Survey. 363  Pension Inequality 
In their  simulation of pattern plans  the authors assume the same 
worker age, tenure, and final salary variations across the race-gender 
groups that they used for their simulations of conventional plans. A 
basic characteristic  of  pattern  plans  is that  they provide almost no 
variation in benefit levels across groups of workers with equal tenure. 
For such a benefit structure to be acceptable to a participant population, 
there usually would have to be minimal variation in final salaries under 
the plan. Otherwise the plan would play an inconsistent role in main- 
taining the standard of living for workers retiring under the plan. Most 
pattern  plans operate in  unionized  settings where the ability to dis- 
criminate on the basis of gender or race for purposes of setting salaries 
is quite limited. In addition what salary discrimination that previously 
might have existed has been obviated by the Civil Rights Act of  1964. 
Furthermore, pattern plans often have only a tenure requirement as 
the criteria for retirement eligibility prior to the normal retirement age 
specified in the plan. For example, the “30 and out” provisions in the 
UAW  plans permit retirement with unreduced benefits at any age for 
workers with 30 years of service. The prevalence of such criteria means 
that many workers retiring under “30 and out” plans tend to have the 
full tenure needed to fulfill this provision. This phenomenon is accen- 
tuated because many of these plans include portability provisions that 
grant a worker credit for tenure under similar plans with other em- 
ployers. So, an auto worker shifting from one firm to another will get 
credit from the second employer’s plan for service under the first. 
The combination of limited salary variation and relatively consistent 
tenure patterns under pattern plans tends to suppress variation in ben- 
efits. A more careful specification of the characteristics of individuals 
participating under both conventional and pattern plans would likely 
result in different comparative results than those presented in the La- 
zear-Rosen analysis. 
The analysis conducted here should be expanded and refined in sev- 
eral regards. First, any analysis of the distributional effects of retire- 
ment programs certainly should include social security. Second, much 
more attention should be paid to the distributive effects that might arise 
because some workers do not participate in pension plans. Third, a 
more precise specification of attained age, tenure, and final salary char- 
acteristics under the various types of plans is critical for such an anal- 
ysis. Finally, I think the basic question posed here can only be ade- 
quately addressed with better data. Regrettably, such data exist at the 
Department of Labor but will  probably never be made available for 
public use. This Page Intentionally Left Blank